India’s Foreign Policy

By Dr. Tomasz Gerlach

(Expert, Centre for Intl Relations, Poland)

As a result of the war in Iran and the potential for a broader conflict in West Asian region, India’s multi-vector foreign policy, which focuses on expanding its presence in East Asia and developing good neighbourly relations, and ultimately on becoming a global player, is being put to a difficult test. Prime Minister Modi’s unequivocal support for Israel’s approach to Palestinian issue and its policy towards Iran could bring unpleasant consequences for Delhi.

While Modi’s visit to Israel in February 2026, days before attack on Iran by Israel and US, was lambasted by Opposition of weakening the country’s security, it, however, fits into the increasingly clear narrative of India’s global importance, its role as a leading power, not one played by more powerful rivals. This is true given current militarization of foreign relations, which, in turn, increases the number of potential contenders for hegemony. Besides the two main players, US and China, there’s also Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, and, on the other hand, North Korea and Iran.

Extended Neighbourhood Strategy

During 2009 Shangri La Conference, Defence Secretary Robert Gates further defined India’s role as a “net security provider “ for countries bordering Indian Ocean, in ensuring their security and engaging in “military diplomacy” when necessary, using India’s own army and navy. The role assigned to India by Gates aligns with its raison d’état, as it has long considered countries of this region its sphere of influence, and Indian diplomacy treats them as a key destination for economic investment and a shared cultural and civilizational heritage.

The Mahasagar (Great Ocean) strategy, launched by Modi in 2025, envisions mutual and holistic growth and security for all South Asian nations. Additionally, it encompasses a much broader geographic area, a “stretched neighbourhood.” It was preceded by Sagar strategyfocused on Indian Ocean basin countries located near India, already well into maritime dimension of “Belt and Road” policy.

India has presented its own proposals for cooperation in the region several years ago, Indo-Pacific Initiative (IPOI), in 2019. In 2017, at QUAD summit in Manila, India, with Australia, Japan, and US, reaffirmed readiness to strengthen partnership to militarily and diplomatically contain China’s ambitions in the region and in South China Sea in particular.

India is active in numerous regional forums such as Indo-Pacific Economic Forum and Indian Ocean Rim Association. Understandably, by activating its relations with East Asian countries under the ActEast policy and finding allies, India is entering China’s sphere of influence.

The implementation of Act East Policy iscontingent on ties with neighbours, proper functioning and balancing which is crucial for it. India is bounded to the north by the Himalayas, so road infrastructure is essential, requiring harmonious cooperation across the region, which has a Muslim population.

The India Neighbourhood Policy encompasses India’s key foreign policy priorities, focusing on Indian Ocean basin, an area of exceptional strategic importance. Countries located close to India, have already found themselves in advanced stages of China’s maritime “Belt and Road”policy. Chinese port investments in Sri Lanka (port of Hambantota), Chinese port in Doraleh near Djibutti, political and economic rapprochement, and similar Chinese maritime investments with Maldives, Myanmar, and Pakistan are stirring emotions in India.

New Delhi is trying to match China’s port investments, including Chabahar port in Iran and Sittwe port in Myanmar. Their effectiveness could threaten Washington’s strategic goals in this region. India is striving for dominance, however, countries bordering Indian Ocean don’t necessarily agree with its asserted position of dominance, and bilateral relations with them are rife with anti-Indian sentiment stemming from historical experiences that tend to define India as an interventionist power. Furthermore, the complex internal situation of these countries, having Muslim populations, may now further complicate implementation of this policy.

Bilateral Ties

Relations between India and Pakistan are the most frayed. New Delhi fears renewed terrorist attacks in Kashmir, especially under Sharif’s government. Both Washington and Beijing are using internal tensions in Pakistan to unsettle India, as is evident with recent outbreak of Pakistan-Afghan conflict.

Relations with Bangladesh remain unstable following fall of Hasina’s regime. Mutual distrust persists, fuelled by infiltration of terrorists on either side. The new government shall seek to improve relations, as Prime Minister Tariq Rahman understands, but not at expense of its  political independence.

Another example of instability is Maldives. President Mohamed Muizu won the presidency in 2023 under slogan “India Out, for India Out.” The new government is seeking to deepen military alliances with China, while terminating similar cooperation agreements with India, which has jeopardized viability of India’s strategy in Indian Ocean region.

Road infrastructure is being built through Myanmar as part of ActEast policy, so India must maintain good relations with General Hlaing’s ruling junta, despite criticism from Western countries. China continues to attempt to seize lands in Ladakh and Galwan Valley. Nepal is  engaging in similar “cartographic anti-diplomacy,” currently printing maps claiming lands which belong to India.

Indian and Chinese political interest and economic investments intersect in this vast area. However, it seems both are trying to prevent a conflict. China, as a highly centralized state ruled by Communist Party, is a difficult opponent for democratic India. Diplomats on both sides navigate an understandable lack of trust with the need to balance their mutual relations.

Between US &China

Indian politicians are aware that President Trump’s administration views South and Southeast Asian countries as a kind of “line of resistance” to China’s aspirations, and Washington sees India as a component of this line, potentially to be “used’ in a strategy to contain Chinese activity. Will India manage to balance its Mahasagarpolicy to avoid American and Chinese pressure while continuing its policy of independence?

Indian politicians realise given their current economic, technological, material, and human resources, they are unable to use force and employ tactics of “diplomatic pushback” or “soft refusal” toward China and Washington. Perhaps one reason India has not expressed its position on Ukraine or Gazaconflicts and remains ambiguous viz kidnapping of Venezuelan president, preferring to rely on interpretations of international law.

New trade tariffs imposed by Americans explain the emergence of anti-American sentiment in India. Externally imposed thesis that India should prioritize American interests over its own in mutual relations and consider itself a “useful country” needed by Americans to implement their policies, is unacceptable.

Mutual visits and bilateral talks demonstrate how difficult relations with Washington are, as both sides have differing interests and policy goals in the region. It’s believed US will constantly pressure India to adapt to its policy objectives. This is inevitable, given India’s ambition to become fourth power after US, China, and Russia. Indian politicians must skilfully”play” with US administration if they want to avoid being excluded from Washington’s foreign policy strategy in Asian region, while maintaining established freedom in foreign relations.

India’s foreign policy is irritating Trump administration, as evidenced by FBI’s arrest of Ashley Tellis, an “influencer” of Indian interests in US, who used his senior position at Carnegie Foundation. Americans’ dissatisfaction with India’s freedom in formulating its immediate and long-term policy goals has too been expressed through introduction of various restrictions/limitations on visa policy, suspension of student visas, criticism against close ties with Moscow, etc. US is also concerned over emerging trilateral alliance between India, Russia, and China. — INFA