Handling Protests at Home

By Dr. D.K. Giri

(Prof. of Practice, Inst of Management Bhubaneshwar)

Every political action in India — whether in a district town or on the streets of Delhi — that is disruptive or touches upon fundamental rights, political, civil or human, now draws global attention within hours. That is both the price and the privilege of being the world’s largest democracy in the age of live television and viral social media.

The agitation against the Union Minister for Education, launched by what some TV channels are calling the “Cockroach Janata Party” is the latest illustration of this new reality. What begins as a domestic contest over policy or governance quickly becomes international news about how India handles dissent.

First of all, let us talk about the foreign hand debate, evidence vs optics. Within days of the protests, a fierce internal debate began on the involvement of foreign elements. Several prime-time panels and digital news channels have pointed to “Chinese clandestine support” to the agitators. The presence of known Communist leaders and student groups at protest sites is being presented as circumstantial evidence.

Let us be clear: it is entirely possible that foreign powers monitor, amplify, and even seek to exploit domestic unrest. That is a standard geopolitical practice, not unique to India. Every major democracy faces it.

The real question for India, however, is evidentiary. Is there any tangible, verifiable proof of direct involvement this time? Funding trails, digital forensics, intercepted coordination — so far, what we have on public record is correlation shown on TV, not causation proven in policy or any other forum.

When the “foreign hand” is invoked without hard proof, two things happen. Domestically, it risks becoming a convenient way to delegitimize dissent. Internationally, it invites greater scrutiny. Foreign governments and think-tanks start asking: if New Delhi is seeing foreign interference everywhere, what does that say about the health of its own democratic debate?

The second concern is that we have been shown for two Indias on screen depicting the optics war. This challenge is visual. In today’s media environment, images travel faster than arguments. Mainstream television channels have run repeated loops of stone-pelting, man-handling of police personnel, and damaged police vehicles. The message is clear: this is a breakdown of law and order.

Simultaneously, sympathetic social media handles and international citizen-journalist accounts are running parallel loops of lathi charge, tear gas, and alleged police brutality. The message there is equally clear: this is a crackdown on democratic voice.

The moment the Leader of the Opposition, Rahul Gandhi, was physically lifted off the street, both narratives hardened. The police have stated that none of the protest groups had prior permission, which is required for staging such demonstrations in designated areas. That is a law and order procedure. The Opposition has called it the suppression of constitutional right to protest.

When citizens at home see two completely contrasting Indias, the world sees them too. And foreign editors, diplomats, and investors draw their own conclusions — often from 15-second clips, not 15-page reports.

Why this matters abroad? Let us remember that credibility is currency. I suspect PM Modi is not losing sleep over whether the Opposition or any fringe party can pull him down electorally in the near term. His political base remains strong. But he should worry about how democratic capitals read these images, because credibility is now a core component of national power.

India today is seeking deep political, economic and technological partnerships with the very Western democracies that watch us closest. The US, EU, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada — these are not just export markets. They are partners in semiconductors, defence tech, clean energy, and AI. They are also countries where Parliament, media, and civil society ask tough questions about democratic norms.

So when neutral countries like Switzerland publicly mention human rights concerns in India, it should raise hackles in New Delhi. Our External Affairs Minister has rightly countered Switzerland’s version and reminded them of India’s own robust institutions. But the fact that Switzerland felt the need to speak at all tells us something: the global democracy club is watching our conduct, not just our GDP growth rate.

We have already seen Wangchuck solidarity protests in Britain, the Netherlands, Ireland, the United States and Germany. Diaspora groups organized them, and local media covered them. Could the government have prevented such reactions abroad by better communication and calmer handling of the movement at home? That is the uncomfortable but necessary question.

To be fair, no government enjoys being in the middle of a disruptive protest. Policing is hard, and violence by a few cannot be allowed to hijack the right of the many. But image is built over a pattern, not one event. Two other recent episodes compound the perception problem for external observers.

First, the government’s handling of Sonam Wangchuk’s hunger strike in Ladakh. Here was a climate and tribal rights activist using a Gandhian method. The optics of a long fast being met with administrative silence created space for international NGOs to frame it as “ignoring indigenous voices.”

Second, the fallout and mismanagement around the NEET exam. For millions of students and parents, it was about fairness and future. Abroad, it was read as “youth trust deficit.” Each of these, on its own, is a domestic issue. Together, they create a narrative that foreign editorials and parliaments pick up: “Is India’s democratic process keeping pace with India’s economic rise?”

In a democracy, the core principle is protest and order are not enemies. Let’s state the democratic baseline plainly. Protest is a fundamental feature of democracy. A genuinely democratic government cannot deny people the right to protest, nor can it ruthlessly try to suppress it. History shows that suppression only drives dissent underground and makes it sharper later.

It is equally true that in a democracy, protest must be peaceful and cannot stray into vandalism and violence. The state has both the right and the duty to maintain public order, protect property, and ensure citizens’ safety.

The art of democratic governance lies in upholding both simultaneously. Give space for peaceful dissent. Act firmly but proportionately against violence. Communicate clearly why action is being taken. And allow Parliament to be the first forum for debate, not the last.

When that balance slips, the image cost is real. Partners start qualifying their statements. Investors start adding “governance risk” to their models. Adversaries get talking points.

Finally, the Image is national interest. So, is the image of Indian democracy dented abroad by mishandling protest and dissent at home? The answer is: not fatally, not permanently. India’s democratic credentials are deep, and the world knows our elections are massive, free, and decisive.

But yes, a little. Enough for competitors to use it in human rights reports. Enough for partners to ask quiet questions in bilateral meetings. Enough for the global media to lead with conflict visuals instead of reform stories. And that matters because it is absolutely in the national interest to project a sound and moral image of the country. In the 21st century, power is not just tanks and trade. It is trust.

Growth and development are non-negotiable for India’s future. But they cannot come at the cost of democratic decency — debates in Parliament, building political consensus, and space for peaceful dissent.

The strongest answer to any “foreign hand” allegation is not just a press release. It is a confident, open, and fair handling of our own people. When the world sees Indians arguing vigorously but constitutionally, policing firmly but humanely, and institutions working transparently, the “India story” becomes unbreakable.

That is the image we need for the next decade — not just a fast-growing economy, but a mature democracy that can absorb friction without breaking, and can argue with itself without inviting the world to judge it. — INFA