Beijing's White Paper

By Maciej Gaca

(Centre for International Relations, Poland)

Since China’s new white paper “More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals, and Actions,” was published this June, full responses from regional think tanks are still to come. However, previous studies of Xi Jinping’s four major initiatives,2021 Global Development Initiative, 2022 Global Security Initiative, 2023 Global Civilisation Initiative, and 2025 Global Governance Initiative, consolidated into one initiative provide a consistent picture.

The white paper summarises key elements of Xi’s project, gives them a common vocabulary, and presents China as a country uniquely equipped to lead the world through a period of instability. Beijing positions itself as a defender of the UN, globalisation, development, and the voice of Global South. Further, it protects its own political model from external scrutiny, narrows the universal dimension of human rights, and embeds the CCP’s interests within the notion of global stability.

In Taiwan, the Institute for National Defence and Security Studies assesses that Chinese foreign policy is shifting from a competition for resources and influence to one over institutions, norms, and language. Beijing treats Global South as a platform for political mobilisation. China presents itself as a representative of developing countries, strengthens BRICS, and invests in infrastructure, attempting to transform diverse countries into a group exerting collective influence. However, Taiwanese analysts emphasise that Global South doesn’t form a unified bloc. Individual states have differing security interests, varying relationships with the US and Europe, and their own regional ambitions.

The National Defence and Security Research study on Chinese security policy indicates Global Governance Initiative adopts universally held concepts—sovereignty, rule of law, and multilateralism—and interprets them in accordance with the logic of the Chinese system. The development of regulations in the areas of cyberspace, data, and AI is intended to provide China with a favourable interpretative space and legitimise a control model based on “digital sovereignty.”

In Japan, the National Institute for Defence Studies sees the Global Security Initiative as a global version of Xi Jinping’s comprehensive national security concept. External security policy is therefore linked to protecting the CCP’s power, political system, and ideological security. The Japan Institute of International Affairs, in turn, emphasises the synchronisation of Chinese mediation, BRI investments, and security cooperation. Mediation provides Beijing with access to conflicting parties, strengthens its political position, and creates conditions for economic presence, even if it does not lead to a lasting resolution of disputes.

The South Korean Asan Institute interprets the GGI announcement at SCO summit as a signal of China’s intention to use its influence in international organisations to reshape global governance in its favour. From Seoul’s perspective, China’s criticism of alliances is particularly significant. Beijing may link references to UN Charter with attempts to weaken security relations between the US and its Asian partners.

In Australia, a Lowy Institute analysis shows that China is reforming the UN from within, promoting the primacy of states and weakening the importance of universal values. The results are mixed: large financial contributions, staff presence, and diplomatic activity do not always translate into acceptance of the Chinese language. The Australian Institute of International Affairs, meanwhile, describes Xi’s system as “flexible authoritarianism”: the party leadership sets broad strategic goals, while the administration, state-owned enterprises, and other contractors are given freedom to operate within clearly defined boundaries. This helps explain how Xi’s broad slogans can be implemented by multiple, seemingly independent institutions.

Indian analyses go further, sometimes too far toward an intelligence-securitisation approach. Their usefulness, however, lies in pointing out that China’s global initiatives don’t operate in isolation. Development, security, civilization, data, training, international organisations, and new regulatory domains create an infrastructure of influence where the soft rhetoric of cooperation intersects with the hard interests of the party-state. ORF describes the GGI as a fourth pillar alongside the GDI, GSI, and GCI, and as a shift from public diplomacy to the restructuring of norms and institutions. Its harsher language should be treated with caution, but the observation about the convergence of tools is apt.

In France, Alice Ekman of IFRI has been emphasising for years that China’s increased commitment to multilateralism has an ideological dimension. Beijing wants to counter the influence of liberal democracies, expose their weaknesses, and promote its own model. The Institut Montaigne links China’s external ambitions with centralisation of power, pervasive control, technological self-sufficiency, and the primacy of national security.

The Finnish FIIA presents the most balanced position. Chinese initiatives contain constructive proposals for cooperation, the representation of developing countries, and reform of international organisations. Their weakness lies in the lack of a precise implementation roadmap. “True multilateralism” also implies a limited role for the West, and the initiatives remain linked to the protection of the PRC’s sovereignty and the CCP’s authority. Jyrki Kallio warns against the possibility of externally combining the language of humanitarian leadership with hegemonic instruments.

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs adds an important correction regarding Global South. The claims of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa to speak for the entire group are weak. These countries often pursue their own interests and compete with each other. Membership in BRICS does not automatically mean joining the Chinese bloc.

The Global South appears in the white paper almost like an electoral college for Chinese legitimacy, although no one has given Beijing a mandate to represent such a diverse part of the world.The best way to evaluate the document is to examine its principles when they conflict with Beijing’s direct political interests.

The Chinese project has real appeal. Many countries have experienced Western double standards, conditional aid, military intervention, and marginalisation in financial institutions. Beijing appeals to genuine grievances and frustrations. It offers infrastructure, market access, credit, training, and the language of dignity and sovereignty.

Criticism of the Chinese project should be based on questions about definitions, procedures, and practice. Who represents “the people”? Who evaluates the results? Can social organisations operate independently of the state? Does the law also apply to a great power when the outcome is unfavourable to it? Can civilisational diversity justify violence against individuals? Does a developing country retain the ability to reject China? Does Taiwanese society have the right to define its own identity?

The June 2026 white paper contains little institutional specificity. It lacks a plan for reforming international organisations, decision-making procedures, oversight principles, and accountability mechanisms. Its significance lies primarily in clarifying the language China uses to describe the crisis in the international order.

It would be a mistake to dismiss this white paper as empty propaganda. A vast financial, diplomatic, and institutional network operates around these ideas. China possesses the resources, personnel, partner organisations, market, and patience needed to gradually shift norms.

Equally risky would be to accept the Chinese narrative without perspective. Contributions to global governance do not entitle one to monopolise its definition. Portraying one’s own interests as the interests of the entire Global South remains a pretence, and civilisational heritage does not constitute a source of international political legitimacy. — INFA