By Maciej Gaca

(Centre for International Relations, Poland)

Much of the diagnosis of China’s new white paper, “More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals, and Actions,” published this June, is accurate The UN is losing its capacity to act effectively, representation of developing countries in international institutions remains disproportionate to their importance, WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is paralysed, implementation of SDGs is lagging, and policies of sanctions, technological barriers, and unilateral tariffs are increasingly replacing predictable rules. The crisis is real, and Beijing has absolutely no need to invent a crisis of the international order.

The problem begins when Beijing, in describing the crisis of international order, also adopts the very words with which it is supposed to be named and resolved. ‘Justice,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘rule of law,’ ‘multilateralism,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘security,’ and ‘people-centered approach’ all sound familiar, but in the Chinese document they mean something different than in the language of liberal democracies. Above all, they refer not to control of power, individual rights, pluralism of debate, but to state sovereignty, political stability, and government’s right to define the boundaries of permissible dispute.

The document’s English version doesn’t change its core content but weakens the impression of building a new system and reinforces the language of justice, principles, and multilateral correction of existing order. The Chinese reader sees a systemic project; the foreign reader receives the language of reform and cooperation. The white paper is therefore worth reading as a programmatic document and as a consciously crafted version of political language.

An integration document

The white paper is more significant than just another piece of Chinese government propaganda. It represents the first comprehensive attempt to consolidate Xi Jinping’s four major initiatives into a single framework: 2021 Global Development Initiative, 2022 Global Security Initiative, 2023 Global Civilization Initiative, and 2025 Global Governance Initiative.

The document also organises the relationships between these initiatives. The development initiative provides resources and economic presence. The security initiative creates a language legitimising protection of state sovereignty and stability. The civilization initiative provides arguments against the universalisation of political norms. The global governance initiative aims to incorporate these principles into institutions, procedures, and future regulations.

Beijing is choosing to modernise the existing order from within. Building a completely parallel system would be costly, risky, and unreliable. The UN offers China veto power on the Security Council, increasing financial participation, access to specialised agencies, seats for Chinese officials, and the ability to introduce its own terminology into resolutions and policy documents. This is quite clearly: the existing system shouldn’t be dismantled or replaced. It must be “reformed and improved.” The document claims that Global Governance Initiative has received support from 160-odd countries and international organisations, and over 60 countries have joined its Group of Friends.

From participation to right to lead

The evolution of Xi Jinping’s policy can be described as a shift from seeking recognition for Chinese model to claiming the right to co-create and, increasingly, to set rules. The most telling passages are found towards the end of the document. We read that since its foundation, Chinese Communist Party has pursued the mission of promoting human progress and “great world harmony.” It places Mao Zedong, Theory of Three Worlds, Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 5000 years of Chinese civilization, and contemporary leadership of Xi Jinping within a single historical framework. This is not simply a presentation of foreign policy. It is a genealogy of the right to leadership.

Five Principles &Five Meaning Shifts

The central part of the white paper is formed by five principles of Global Governance Initiative: sovereign equality of states, international rule of law, multilateralism, a human-centered approach, and a focus on concrete results. Each has a compelling normative layer and contains an element that requires scrutiny.

Sovereign equality

Beijing accurately points to excessive dominance of a few countries in the international system. Reform of quotas at IMF and WB is overdue. Countries in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia have little influence over institutions whose decisions directly impact their economies.

The Chinese definition of sovereignty, however, goes further. It encompasses the state’s right to independently choose its social system and path of development, and a strong prohibition on interference in internal affairs. The state becomes the primary and almost exclusive representative of society.

This model lacks an answer to the question of what happens when a state violates the rights of its own citizens, restricts the rights of minorities, or prevents society from controlling those in power.

International rule of law

The white paper invokes the UN Charter, equal application of law, and prohibition of use of force. It criticises unilateral sanctions, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and double standards. These arguments have resonated far beyond China.

The problem is selectivity. International rule of law is reduced to norms accepted by states, particularly permanent members of Security Council. Significantly less emphasis is placed on an independent international judiciary, state responsibility, universal human rights, and ability to assess the actions of great powers without their consent.

True multilateralism

The term ‘true multilateralism” appears with exceptional frequency in Chinese diplomacy. Its function is polemical, suggesting that some existing formats of cooperation are false, exclusionary, or subservient to hegemony.

The white paper criticises “small circles,” blocs, alliance systems, and exclusionary agreements. This is a clearly recognizable attack on NATO, the G7, Quad, AUKUS, and other cooperation formats among democratic states. The SCO and BRICS are given a completely different moniker: they are supposed to represent equitable multipolarity and democratisation of international relations.

The asymmetry is obvious. A format in which China plays a central role is considered inclusive. A format that limits Chinese influence becomes a manifestation of ‘bloc politics.’ Multilateralism thus takes the form of multilateralism accepted by Beijing. Its legitimacy is largely determined by its attitude toward Chinese security interests.

A human-centered approach

This is the document’s most misleading concept. The authors declare that people are participants and direct beneficiaries of global governance. They then move on to development, security, health, cultural exchange, and “a sense of having benefited.”

Humans primarily function as recipients of outcomes delivered by the state. They rarely appear as autonomous entities possessing rights that they can enforce against the state. NGOs are mentioned, but as a resource that should be combined with those of governments and international organisations. They don’t act as an independent source of oversight, knowledge, and accountability.

The White Paper also outlines China’s hierarchy of human rights: rights are to be protected through security, developed through development, and promoted through cooperation. Political rights are incorporated into the broader state project. The state determines the order, pace, and limits of their implementation.

Specific actions

The fifth principle addresses the frequent accusation that Chinese initiatives consist largely of slogans. The document presents hundreds of figures on trade, infrastructure, development aid, training, health care, energy, and contributions to the UN.

However, indicators usually measure the input, scale, or number of activities. The number of signed agreements doesn’t indicate their quality. The number of trained individuals doesn’t explain the skills acquired or how they were subsequently utilised. The total amount of approved loans doesn’t equate to development outcomes.

What the numbers say

The white paper begins with figures describing the world’s crisis. By 2025, over 50 countries were expected to be directly involved in conflict or war. Nearly 80% of assessable goals of 2030 Agenda are being implemented too slowly or are regressing. Over 830 million people live in extreme poverty, and 2.3 billion experience food insecurity.

The document then moves on to numbers showing China’s capabilities. Beijing has signed BRI documents with over 150 countries and 30 international organisations. China-Europe Railway Express trains made over 130,000 trips. China’s trade with BRI participants reached 23.6 trillion renminbi in 2025, accounting for 51.9% of China’s total foreign trade. Bilateral investment between China and BRI partners exceeded $240 billion between 2021 and mid-2025.

Under GDI, over 1,800 projects have been launched and 80,000 people trained. Mobilised development resources are expected to exceed $23 billion. China’s share of the UN’s regular budget has increased from less than one% in 2000 to over 20% by 2025. China has deployed over 50,000 peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping missions. Chinese medical teams are expected to treat 300 million patients in 77 countries and regions.

These figures should not be underestimated. They demonstrate the material scale of China’s presence, its ability to organise networks, and Beijing’s growing importance within the UN system. A country financing one-fifth of the organization’s regular budget gains real leverage in the debate over the division of influence.

In the document, numbers serve another function: they transform material contributions into moral claims. China invests, finances, and provides public goods, and thus—according to the text’s logic—has a special right to “lead the age.”— INFA