[ Rabi S Chakma ]

The Constitution of India guarantees to every citizen the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice, and propagate religion. These freedoms are not gifts from the state, nor do they depend upon the approval of family members, community leaders, village authorities, or any government official. They are fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.

It is against this constitutional backdrop that the Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 1978 (APFRA) deserves careful public discussion and judicial examination.

At first glance, the title of the legislation appears reassuring. The phrase ‘Freedom of Religion Act’ naturally creates the impression that the law exists primarily to protect religious liberty. In a secular democratic republic, a law carrying such a title would ordinarily be expected to safeguard freedom of conscience, the right to adopt or change one’s faith, the freedom to worship, and the equal treatment of all religions before the law.

However, a closer reading of the Act raises an important question: does the legislation primarily protect religious freedom, or does it primarily regulate religious conversion?

The Constitution of India, through Articles 25 to 28, protects religious liberty as a fundamental right. Article 25 is particularly significant because it guarantees freedom of conscience. This means that matters of faith ultimately belong to the individual. Every citizen has the right to believe, not believe, change beliefs, retain existing beliefs, or adopt a different faith according to personal conviction.

A genuine Freedom of Religion Act wouldtherefore be expected to place this freedom at its centre. It would protect the liberty of every citizen to choose, practice, and peacefully share his or her faith without discrimination or undue interference.

Yet the operative provisions of the APFRA focus largely on regulating and penalising certain forms of religious conversion. While the title speaks of ‘freedom’, the Act contains no explicit provisions guaranteeing freedom of conscience, protecting citizens from religious discrimination, affirming the right to adopt a religion of one’s choice, or safeguarding the equal treatment of all faiths. Consequently, many citizens may reasonably ask whether the title accurately reflects the substance of the legislation.

If the principal objective of the Act is to prohibit conversions brought about by force, fraud, or inducement, another important question arises: why is a separate religion-specific law necessary when existing laws already prohibit such conduct?

Force, threats, intimidation, coercion, cheating, fraud, misrepresentation, and other unlawful acts are already punishable under India’s legal framework. If a person is threatened, deceived, coerced, or unlawfully influenced in matters of religion, the state already possesses legal mechanisms to investigate and prosecute such offences. Therefore, many citizens may legitimately wonder whether the APFRA serves only to prevent criminal conduct or whether it also imposes additional restrictions upon the exercise of religious freedom itself.

Particular attention has also been drawn to Section 2(c) of the Act, which defines “indigenous faith” by specifically recognising certain religious traditions and practices prevalent among particular communities of Arunachal Pradesh, including Buddhism, Vaishnavism, Donyi-Polo, and other traditional forms of worship.

The preservation of indigenous traditions is undoubtedly important and deserving of respect. Arunachal possesses a rich cultural and spiritual heritage that forms an invaluable part of India’s diversity. However, questions arise when the law identifies and recognises certain faith traditions while excluding others, including Christianity, which has been followed by a significant section of the state’s population for generations.

India is a secular republic. The Constitution does not establish an official religion, nor does it permit the state to favour one religion over another. The constitutional expectation is that all religions stand equal before the law. Therefore, whether such classifications are fully consistent with constitutional principles of equality, secularism, and religious neutrality is a matter worthy of judicial consideration.

Similarly, Section 5 requires intimation to government authorities regarding conversion ceremonies. This provision raises another constitutional concern. Matters of faith and conscience are deeply personal. Many citizens may therefore ask whether an individual should be required to inform the state while exercising a fundamental right relating to personal belief.

The Constitution protects not merely external religious practices but also the inner freedom of conscience. Whether administrative reporting requirements concerning religious conversion are compatible with constitutional guarantees of liberty, dignity, privacy, and freedom of conscience is a question that deserves thoughtful examination by the courts.

The issue at stake is not whether force, fraud, or coercion should be prohibited. They unquestionably should be. Nor is the issue about whether indigenous cultures deserve protection. They certainly do.

The real question is whether the protection of culture and the prevention of unlawful conduct can be achieved without placing unnecessary burdens upon constitutional freedoms. The Constitution seeks to maintain both objectives simultaneously: protecting individuals from coercion while preserving their freedom to choose and practice their faith according to conscience.

Unfortunately, debates concerning religion often become clouded by prejudice, political interests, fear, or emotional rhetoric. In such circumstances, constitutional principles are frequently overshadowed. Those who raise concerns about a law are sometimes accused of opposing culture or tradition, while those who support the law are portrayed as opponents of religious freedom. Such polarisation does not serve democracy.

A mature constitutional democracy requires something different. It requires the willingness to examine laws objectively, to engage in respectful debate, and to submit constitutional questions to judicial scrutiny rather than public hostility.

The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land. Every statute, regardless of its age or popularity, must ultimately conform to the principles of liberty, equality, secularism, and justice. If any provision of the APFRA is found to be inconsistent with Articles 14, 21, 25, or the secular character of the Constitution, it deserves reconsideration through lawful constitutional processes.

Therefore, alongside prayer, peaceful advocacy, public dialogue, and democratic engagement, there is merit in seeking constitutional clarification through the high court or the Supreme Court of India. Questions concerning fundamental rights are ultimately matters for judicial determination, not political slogans or majority sentiment.

The debate over the APFRA is not merely about conversion. It is about the meaning of religious freedom itself. Is religious liberty only the freedom to retain one’s existing faith, or does it also include the freedom to change one’s faith according to conscience? The Constitution appears to favour the latter understanding.

A truly free society is not one in which citizens are told what they must believe. A truly free society is one in which every individual enjoys the liberty to follow the dictates of conscience without fear, discrimination, unequal treatment, or unnecessary interference.

That is the constitutional promise of India. It is a promise worthy of protection, and where necessary, worthy of judicial reaffirmation.

Disclaimer: This article is intended solely for public awareness and to express the personal views of the author. It is written in the spirit of constitutional discussion and does not seek to offend any individual, community, religion, or institution. (Rev Rabi S Chakma is the founder of the Changhma Baptist Fellowship)